Layoffs and urban poverty in the state-owned enterprise communities in Shaanxi Province, China by Cheng, Zhiming
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Commerce - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Business and Law 
1-1-2012 
Layoffs and urban poverty in the state-owned enterprise communities in 
Shaanxi Province, China 
Zhiming Cheng 
University of Wollongong, zhiming@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers 
 Part of the Business Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cheng, Zhiming: Layoffs and urban poverty in the state-owned enterprise communities in Shaanxi 
Province, China 2012, 1-41. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/2509 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Layoffs and urban poverty in the state-owned enterprise communities in Shaanxi 
Province, China 
Abstract 
This paper applies a mixed methods approach that combines qualitative and quantitative methods to 
examine urban poverty in China’s state-owned enterprise communities where laid-off workers 
concentrate. A sequential explanatory model using interviews, Participatory Poverty Assessments and 
community household survey on textile and military industries in Shaanxi Province of northwestern China 
shows that low-income households suffered multidimensional disadvantages. Qualitative techniques 
have helped to reveal the hidden aspects of poverty while statistical tools have captured holistic 
information on the communities. These approaches together (Q-squared) consider both the outsiders’ 
and insiders’ views on the laid-off poor and benefit the making of effective anti-poverty policies. 
Keywords 
poverty, shaanxi, communities, urban, enterprise, layoffs, owned, state, province, china 
Disciplines 
Business | Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Publication Details 
Cheng, Z. (2012). Layoffs and urban poverty in the state-owned enterprise communities in Shaanxi 
Province, China. 13th Annual Global Development Conference 'Urbanization and Development: Delving 
Deeper into the Nexus' (pp. 1-41). New Dehi, India: Global Development Network. 
This conference paper is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/2509 
1 
 
Submitted to GDN Medals for Research on Development 
 
Layoffs and Urban Poverty in the State-owned Enterprise Communities in Shaanxi Province, China 
 
Dr. Zhiming Cheng 
 
Lecturer 
School of Economics 
The University of Wollongong 
Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia 
 
Senior Research Associate 
Department of Marketing and Management 
Macquarie University 
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia 
 
Email: zhiming@uow.edu.au 
Tel: +61-2-4221 5351 
  
 2 
Layoffs and Urban Poverty in the State-owned Enterprise Communities in Shaanxi Province, China 
 
Abstract 
This paper applies a mixed methods approach that combines qualitative and quantitative methods to 
examine urban poverty in China’s state-owned enterprise communities where laid-off workers 
concentrate. A sequential explanatory model using interviews, Participatory Poverty Assessments and 
community household survey on textile and military industries in Shaanxi Province of northwestern 
China shows that low-income households suffered multidimensional disadvantages. Qualitative 
techniques have helped to reveal the hidden aspects of poverty while statistical tools have captured 
holistic information on the communities. These approaches together (Q-squared) consider both the 
outsiders’ and insiders’ views on the laid-off poor and benefit the making of effective anti-poverty 
policies.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, there has been an increasing interest in combining qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to further the understanding of poverty and its multiple dimensions because nowadays 
poverty is recognized as a complex phenomenon that goes far beyond conventional monetary 
measures (Kanbur, 2005b). In keeping with this trend and drawing on a combined application of 
qualitative and quantitative methods, this paper analyses the recent state of poverty among laid-off 
state workers in Shaanxi Province of northwestern China, and examines the strengths of mixed 
methods in poverty studies as suggested by Carvalho and White (1997), e.g. examining, explaining, 
confirming, refuting and/or enriching information from one approach with that from the other. 
 
Internationally, quantitative studies of poverty present strengths in comparing different measurement 
units, identifying correlations, estimating prevalence and most importantly, influencing policy makers 
(Chambers, 2005). While quantitative methods still dominate poverty appraisal and policy making, 
qualitative methods (e.g. Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) and the social anthropologic 
approach) are becoming more popular (Narayan, Chambers et al., 2000; Narayan, Patel et al., 2000).  
 
Recently there has been an increasing number of studies drawing on both approaches, despite that 
“the often invoked complementarities between the two approaches (qualitative and quantitative) have 
not managed to overcome or hide the tensions between them” (Kanbur, 2005a). Indeed, the 
distinctions between quantitative and qualitative approaches—whether they have been exaggerated or 
not—have not prevented many attempts to combine them in poverty studies.  
 
Among others, Sharp (2003) uses “contextual data to inform quantitative analysis, for example in 
defining and scaling locally-appropriate indicators of such basic parameters as human capital and 
housing quality”. In South Africa, a poverty standard was set up on the basis of local perceptions of 
poverty (Hargreaves et al., 2007). Howe and McKay (2005) use PPA in conjunction with a household 
survey to provide valuable insight into chronic poverty in Rwanda. The mixed methods approach, as 
claimed by Adato (2007) in which conditional cash transfer programs were evaluated by combining 
survey and ethnographic methods, “enhances the contributions of both methods, providing a richer 
pool of data and greater analytic power than would have been available with either these methods 
alone”.  
 
The mixed methods approach recently experiences faster development in academic research and 
policy making than ever before, being promoted by an increasing number of social scientists 
(Bergman, 2008; Creswell, 2003; Creswell & Clark, 2007; Niglas, 2004; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). Although many epistemological differences can be captured between 
naturalistic and positivist forms of social inquiries, the increasing quantity of research adopting mixed 
methods proves the vitality of this approach in contemporary social sciences.  
 
The paper examines transitional China, where poverty is increasingly confronting cities. Laid-off 
workers retrenched by the shrinking urban state sector and rural-to-urban migrants looking for 
employment are two typical types of urban poor, all of which are associated with the current changes 
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in economy and society. Since the early 1990s, a nationwide labour retrenchment program has 
dismissed tens of millions of state-owned enterprise (SOE) workers, a significant ratio of whom 
worked for military, textile, mining and machinery industries, in the name of state sector restructuring. 
The smashing of lifelong employment and comprehensive social security enclosed in the danwei 
(socialist work unit) system threw a substantial proportion of state workers into indigence. Low 
income, insufficient social protection and overwhelming psychological stress are the most common 
socio-economic labels of this group. Some bureaucrats and academics claim that the sufferings of the 
disadvantaged workers are inevitable costs of market reform and suggest that such problems will be 
solved when the laid-off workers reach retirement age and access the pension.  
 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized that he was concerned about the laid-off workers’ 
reemployment (Zhao, 2009), but the strictly controlled media rarely reported their situations except in 
the case of some “glorious models” of reemployed workers and “helpers and friends” of laid-off 
workers, and said almost nothing of the laid-off workers’ protests throughout China (Cai, 2002; Chen, 
2008; Hurst, 2008). The layoffs problem has been cooling down and many domestic media and some 
research focus have shifted to the rural-to-urban migrants, another group of emerging urban poor. The 
migrant topic carries less political sensitivity than the laid-off workers - the political foundation of 
socialism - do in a communist regime. Overall well-being of the migrants has gradually improved in 
the last few years, but that of the workers has deteriorated rapidly since the 1990s. One newspaper 
editor in Shaanxi Province imparted that the censorship implicitly forbids negative news concerning 
laid-off workers as it would be harmful to the public image of the ruling party and to social stability 
(Interview). Nevertheless, this ongoing problem has wide implications for China’s contemporary 
political economy and socio-economic changes and is worth further investigation after more than one 
decade of the national implementation of layoffs. 
 
Currently quantitative studies form the mainstream in the research on China’s urban poverty. Some 
research addresses the income and consumption patterns of urban poverty, stressing the importance of 
these factors to China’s urban poverty (Li & Sato, 2006; Wan, 2008a). Comparative analysis 
distinguishes three types of monetary poverty, namely “income and consumption”, “income not 
consumption” and “consumption not income”, showing the importance of precautionary 
considerations and special financial needs among urban households in a rapidly changing society 
(Knight & Li, 2007). In order to meet the urgent policy needs, some applied research estimates 
money-metric poverty lines in terms of income, consumption, equivalent scales and subjective 
well-being (Gustafsson et al., 2004; Wan, 2008b). Some multidisciplinary studies have also provided 
insights into the problem. For example, the analytical framework of political economy has been 
adopted by urban geographers to explain the conflicts between state and working class and the 
function of deteriorating socialist welfare in the process of institutional transformation (Wang, 2005; 
Wu, 2004).  
 
Since most research projects are still discipline-based and mainly or solely rely on quantitative or 
qualitative method, relatively new methods, such as the capabilities and participatory approaches, 
have seldom or never been used in urban poverty studies in China. In the meantime, the numerous 
publications have made a less-than-anticipated contribution to policy practice, indicating that progress 
towards understanding the dimensions of poverty among the laid-off has been uneven, and that deeper 
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research is needed. For instance, gender and housing issues, which have been studied extensively in 
sociology and urban geography, have been less addressed in economic studies (Huang & Jiang, 2009; 
Logan et al., 2009). Changes to the egalitarian distribution system amidst an increasing level of 
material comfort could explain why inequality affects the low-income group (Davis, 2000). However, 
there has not been enough work on how poverty is associated with the layoffs and reform and on the 
livelihood and life trajectories of laid-off workers.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides details of the methodology, including 
relevant literature, research context and methods of data collection. The third and fourth sections 
correlate the changes of workers’ well-being with the changes of SOEs in an historical time frame, 
and analyse results from PPAs and surveys. The fifth section presents some cases where qualitative 
data could complement the quantitative studies by revealing the hidden aspects that are not simply 
addressed by survey data. The final section is a conclusion. 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Methodological consideration 
 
Research on China’s inequality and urban poverty has been fruitfully generated thanks to the 
availability of high-quality data with large sample size, wide area coverage and comprehensive 
information (Appleton et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2008; Chen, 2006; Giles et al., 2006; Giles et al., 2005; 
Gustafsson et al., 2008; Ravallion & Chen, 2006). These studies provide comprehensive yet in-depth 
understandings of urban poverty, particularly at national and provincial levels. Due to the legacies of 
the pre-reform urban economy and state-led development, the urban poor are concentrated in 
specified types of residential areas, e.g. degraded workers’ villages (once) affiliated with SOEs (Wu, 
2007). These SOE communities have many characteristics that are different from other low-income 
communities (e.g. private housing areas and migrant villages) in poverty profiles, correlations and the 
like. More detailed community level studies are needed as large-scale surveys do not necessarily 
contribute to the understanding of urban poverty insofar as they intend to achieve representative 
sampling rather than to grasp the contextual meaning of poverty. The SOE community has in fact 
been a trigger of social instability (Chen, 2008). From a practical point of view, SOE communities are 
becoming more and more important because the success of anti-poverty policy is heavily dependent 
on the acceptance and support of the community. Therefore a people-centred, pro-poor approach to 
benefit policy making is suggested (Chang & Tipple, 2009). In light of this, a household survey was 
used to collect information regarding individuals and households in these communities, 
 
Studies show that China’s remarkable increase in per capita income has dramatically reduced the 
poverty rate defined by the World Bank’s dollar-a-day poverty line from 64 percent at the beginning 
of the reform to 10 percent recently (Dollar, 2007). However, poverty reduction induced by output 
growth is a narrow and incomplete measure. For example, inequalities have been enlarging rapidly 
throughout the transition from planned to market economy (Hussain et al., 1994; Khan et al., 1999; 
Luo & Zhu, 2008; Wan, 2008b; Wang et al., 2002) and social exclusion has been observed (Li, 2004, 
2005). The widening gulf between rich and poor deters consumption, holds down productivity growth 
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and slows down poverty reduction.  
 
Methodologically, absolute, relative and subjective poverty measures are among the three basic 
approaches to establishing a poverty standard. In China, an absolute poverty line, which denotes the 
amount of money needed to achieve an absolute minimum standard of living, is the most widely used 
(ADB, 2004; WB, 2009). In anti-poverty practices, civil affairs agents rely almost solely on 
money-metric absolute poverty standards, such as the Minimum Living Standard Scheme (MLSS), 
which provides transfers to eligible monetarily poor households, and the Basic Livelihood Relief 
(BLR, or jiben shenghuo fei) for laid-off workers. In sum, the approach based on objective indicators 
merely accounts for heterogeneity (e.g. between cities) in the perception of minimum living standards 
and deems poverty as a unidimensional phenomenon. Relative and subjective poverty lines are much 
less applied in China, although there are recently some pioneering attempts (Bishop et al., 2006; Chen, 
2006; Gustafsson, et al., 2004; Gustafsson & Wei, 2000). These studies catch the current trend 
towards a multidimensional approach - especially subjective well-being (SWB) (Addison et al., 2009).  
In China, the number of SWB studies has increased in academia and governmental institutions (Chen 
& Davey, 2008). Recent studies on the correlation between inequality and happiness, as a 
sub-discipline of SWB, usually categorize the population into three groups, namely rural residents, 
rural-to-urban migrants and urban residents. Most rural residents appeared to be happy despite their 
poverty and disadvantaged socio-economic status because of the lack of information and wider 
reference groups (Knight et al., 2007). Compared with the rural and urban residents, migrants tend to 
be less happy, as their aspirations might have exceeded their actual achievements, and become more 
materialistic after they feel the deprivation relative to their new surroundings (Knight & Gunatilaka, 
2008). Among urban residents, the higher the reference group’s income, the lower the happiness 
(Smyth et al., 2009; Smyth & Qian, 2008).  
 
Examinations of the likelihood of discontent towards distributive injustice show that people judge 
their situation on the basis of reference groups (Han & Whyte, 2008; Whyte, 2010). While poverty 
experience is individualized, very often it also has a collective dimension, especially for the laid-off 
workers who had lived through similar employment, education and other life events. Some shared 
experiences, for example psychological depression under economic stress, feeling of abandonment by 
the ruling party and discontent towards the society, are far beyond the capacity of income and 
consumption measures (Lai & Lee, 2006; Solinger, 2002; Yu, 2008). Workers believed that the state 
would take care of them for life until the massive layoff program smashed such imaginings. When the 
workers were relatively young, state sector employment, as the de facto official guarantee of future 
benefits, gave them confidence in a better future. But such benefits are now totally beyond 
expectation as the result of layoffs. This has also created a chronological reference point that, besides 
the reference of current surroundings, affects the SWB of individuals. In all, these studies make the 
point that external references are important in determining SWB. 
 
To overcome the shortcoming of money-metric poverty lines and to enrich the understanding of urban 
poverty among laid-off workers in Chinese communities, this study constructs a subjective poverty 
line and adopts a SWB approach to investigate the extent to which subjective poverty is determinate 
and influenced by the perception of gaps. Borrowing from the literature of recent research on SWB 
(Kingdon & Knight, 2006) and the relationship of experienced poverty and objective income poverty 
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(Castilla, 2008; Rojas, 2004, 2007), we asked interviewees about their perceptions of the changes of 
household income, the standard of living, minimum consumption and the level of difficulty in making 
ends meet, as well as whether or not they considered themselves poor by using subjective poverty 
questions. Then the interviewees’ perceived gaps were compared with a reference group to see if 
earlier life expectation in terms of health, income, career and family relationships are influential in 
their self-evaluations of poverty status.  
 
2.2 The study sites and data 
 
The field study was conducted in Shaanxi Province in late 2008. As one of the most industrialized 
regions of western China, the provincial capital of Xi’an and its nearby prefectural-level cities of 
Xianyang and Hanzhong were famous for state-owned textile, military, aerospace and electronic 
industries, representing the inner China development model tied to massive state investment (Vermeer, 
1988, 2004). As in other Chinese cities, these industries had provided the majority of urban jobs but 
had been significantly changed by the market reform. Official statistics show that in recent years 
Xi’an has a population of 200,000 unemployed and retrenched workers (Yang & Huang, 2009).  
 
Research sites were selected from SOE residential communities in Xi’an, Xianyang and Hanzhong, 
which are three of the most industrialized and populated cities in Shaanxi. A sequential explanatory 
data collection, in which quantitative data collection was followed by qualitative data collection, was 
applied to the same sample population (Creswell & Clark, 2007). In the quantitative phase, 
households were surveyed under cluster random sampling. The questionnaire mainly collected 
quantitative information on household demography, housing, income, consumption and other 
economic conditions as well as employment details of family members. In the qualitative phase we 
interviewed government officials, enterprise cadres, laid-off workers, retirees and relevant personnel 
(e.g. employers of laid-off workers). Some PPA tools, e.g. poverty mapping, event calendar, wealth 
ranking, causality diagram etc. as introduced in Narayanasamy (2009), were used in focus groups. The 
underlying principle of the qualitative phase was to understand how the workers perceived poverty 
and layoffs. To ensure consistency, the sample for the qualitative phase was chosen from among the 
survey respondents according to preset criteria and preliminary results derived from the first phase 
data.  
 
In Xi’an, 510 valid questionnaires and eight PPAs were finished in four textile and three military 
SOEs. In Xianyang, we conducted some interviews in a famous textile mill where a number of 
nationally renowned female model workers had worked in the Mao era. However, in an environment 
of unrest, where bankruptcy and privatization were in process and the workers were on strike, it was 
not appropriate to conduct the questionnaire survey and PPA. In Hanzhong, visits were made to two 
aerospace-related enterprises built during the Third Front Construction (sanxian jianshe) period 
(mainly 1964-1970s) when the Chinese Government was preparing for potential wars with the 
“revisionist” Soviet Union and the “imperialistic” United States. For security purposes, the enterprises 
were located at the foot of the Qin Mountains, which were several hours away from the city by public 
transportation. Being registered as urban residents but isolated from the city, the workers lived in 
residential communities surrounded by farming villages. This created a rare type of urban poor in the 
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countryside. We interviewed 50 households and finished four PPAs in this community.  
 
3. The creation of laid-off workers 
 
In spite of the importance of Shaanxi Province as a national industrial base, in more than a decade 
only a few English publications have been devoted specifically to its SOE reform and layoffs. Lee 
(1997) inquired into the state-enterprise relationship from the perspective of political economy. 
Watson (1998) canvassed the transformation of SOEs and employment in the late 1990s and presented 
the case of a textile mill in Xi’an.  
 
Recently, in the new wave of SOE reform, the state-owned textile mills in Shaanxi Province were 
again of concern. In the summer of 2008, the No.1 Northwest Cotton Mill in Xianyang, and the 
Tanghua Group comprising five large state-owned textile mills in Xi’an’s fangzhicheng (literally the 
City of Textiles, where the mill in Watson’s research is located) claimed bankruptcy. The former was 
the first textile mill established by the CCP and was once the largest mill in China with nearly 6,000 
staff, while the latter’s bankruptcy, involving more than 580 million yuan and 36,000 staff, was the 
biggest case in the history of Shaanxi Province.  
 
The experiences of these mills were similar (Tables 1 and 2). They were established in the 1950s, 
receiving concentrated state investment, and had been operating continually under the planned 
economy for more than three decades. In the 1980s, the mills were boosted by expanding domestic 
and international market demand. The workers referred to this period as the best time, during which 
they enjoyed the highest level of wages and welfare among the state sector in Shaanxi. In the late 
1980s, the monthly wage for textile workers was between 100 and approximately 300 yuan depending 
on the years of service, while the normal wage in some other SOEs was only around 30 yuan. 
Between the late 1980s and the mid 1990s, in the context of an overheated economy, excessive 
management power - which used to be highly centralized - was granted to the mill cadres who 
attempted to enlarge the product mix and extend business to non-textile areas (e.g. logistics, real estate 
and tourism, to name a few) under the auspices of state-owned commercial banks and local 
governments who were looking for financial return and political achievement. The highly centralized 
authority among top-level cadres caused spending and investment that was largely unsupervised. 
Finally the mills were dragged into large repayments to banks and other creditors, and their cash flows 
were broken after the Central Government decided to burst the economic bubble and to tighten up 
loan approvals in the mid 1990s. The downturn of the textile market in the meantime and later the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis urged the Central Government to downsize the textile industry nationally 
as a component of the national SOE reform. In 1998, 5.12 million textile spindles were enforcedly 
destroyed and 660,000 textile workers were laid off nationally (Han & Chen, 2007). 
 
Besides the textile industry, during the First and Second Five-Year Plans (1953-1962), the Chinese 
Government had allocated Shaanxi Province more than 50 military enterprises and numerous 
supporting institutes (e.g. technical schools, professional colleges and research laboratories), making 
the province a national military base. In the market economy, in which preparing for immediate war 
was no longer needed, the majority of military enterprises were requested to partially - if not totally - 
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change their product mix from military to civilian use. The transformation was awkward. On the one 
hand, it was difficult to transform the usage of some equipment and to retrain the workers, given the 
constrained budget and workers’ narrow skill set. On the other hand, for these enterprises, it was the 
first time they had faced a competitive market. For instance, in the early 2000s, a military 
optoelectronic enterprise changed some of its production capacity to manufacture consumer digital 
cameras, but it soon failed to compete with foreign competitors. Except for some strategically funded 
enterprises (e.g. aerospace and aircraft manufacture) that rely exclusively on Central Government 
orders, many other former military enterprises, in the words of a manager, “did not know where to sell 
the civilian use products that have no comparative advantages in terms of either price or technology” 
(Interview). Soon many of them suffered more severe losses, indicating the transformation was 
disappointingly ineffective. Facing difficulties, some enterprises sold their lands to real estate 
companies or rented out their facilities and buildings to other businesses. By the end of 2005, 24 
centrally managed military enterprises had been bankrupted, more than 120,000 staff had been laid off 
(SBS, 2006), and the number continues to increase.  
 
Before bankruptcy, governments had been trying to rescue these SOEs guided by the principle of 
“grasping the big and letting go the small” (zhuada fangxiao), i.e. selling small and unprofitable 
enterprises and keeping big, profitable and strategically important enterprises. Considering the 
shortage of job opportunities outside the state sector and the importance of the textile industry in the 
local economy, Shaanxi took a slightly different approach from the national strategy of yadian, 
jianyuan, tiaozheng, zengxiao (destroying redundant spindles, reducing staff, adjusting the mill and 
improving efficiency). Reconstruction of the Xi’an and Xianyang mills was undertaken in the hope 
that they could thrive again in the market economy.  
 
In Xianyang, the No. 1 Mill had long been in default to creditors. It was transformed, between 1998 
and 2001, from a solely state-owned mill into a limited liability company in order to avoid these 
unpaid debts by changing the nature of ownership. One cadre admitted that this approach was 
“unethical but effective in dodging the numerous creditors”; otherwise “the bankruptcy would have 
happened a decade ago” (Interview).  
 
In fangzhicheng, four mills were incorporated by a state-owned investment corporation in the name of 
the Tanghua group in 1999 but this later proved to be another unsuccessful move. One dyeing and 
printing mill, once the largest of its type in Asia, attempted to reopen twice, in 1999 and 2001 
respectively, but both efforts failed, wasting more than 12 million yuan. It subsequently disposed of 
all its machines and equipment and rented out its workshops to art galleries. The other three mills 
operated to a partial degree but continued to make losses after the reconstruction. Although in the 
early 2000s, Shaanxi’s textile industry as a whole turned losses into profits, the technical and financial 
inequalities between the textile enterprises in Shaanxi and those in the coastal provinces widened 
(Wang, 2007). Like the military enterprises, they lacked competitive advantage in price, quality and 
variety of product mix. While the coastal state mills had been privatized or joint-ventured and their 
social welfare responsibilities were largely peeled off, the mills in Shaanxi still bore the main 
responsibility for looking after their workers. In 2007, 40 percent of Shaanxi’s textile mills remained 
in deficit (SBS, 2008). The bankruptcy of some of these large mills was unavoidable by 2008.  
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Table 1: Timeline: the No.1 Northwest Cotton Mill, Xianyang 
Period Milestone 
1951 Construction of the mill commenced. The mill recruited urban and rural residents 
and workers who migrated from the coastal region to “support the west”  
1952 The mill commenced operation  
1952-1970s The mill, like some other state-owned mills in Xianyang, was functioning well and 
continued to operate during the Cultural Revolution. A number of model workers 
were promoted and propagandized nationally by the CCP 
1980s This was the mill’s best period comparative to others SOEs 
1989-1996 Investment in a chemical fibre mill failed, generating a liability of 60 million yuan 
1996 In the context of national downturn of the textile industry, the mill experienced its 
first ever deficit, of 38 million yuan, or four times of its net assets 
1998 The first reform: a limited liability company replaced pure state-ownership to shake 
off the debts of 20 million yuan. The workers contributed 20 million yuan to buy 
shares in the new company 
1999 The second reform: Further selling of some state-owned shares to the staff share 
holding committee 
2001 The third reform: Sale of remaining state-owned assets to a privately-owned limited 
liability corporation 
2008 Finally bankrupted with a debt-asset ratio of 346.54% 
Sources: focus groups and interviews 
 
Table 2: Timeline: Cotton mills in fangzhicheng, Xi'an 
Time Milestone 
1950s Construction and operation of fangzhicheng commenced as a national textile base 
with five mills (the Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 Northwest Cotton Mills and the No. 1 
Northwest Dyeing and Printing Mill. 
1950s-1980s Generally a good period, even during the Cultural Revolution. 
1988-1995 The No. 5 Northwest Cotton Mill was transformed to the Five Ring Co., Ltd. By 
borrowing from banks, it invested in high-tech, logistic, financial, real estate and 
tourism industries and built factories in the United States, Australia and Singapore. 
Loans for more than100 projects generated annual interest of nearly 50 million 
yuan.  
1996 The top manager of No. 5 Mill was dismissed and accused of mismanagement. 
1999 Four mills except the No. 5 Mill were incorporated under the Tanghua Group. 
2008 The Tanghua Group announced bankruptcy and some small-scale strikes and 
petitions happened.  
Sources: focus groups and interviews 
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While there was not much hope towards the mills, compensation and post-bankruptcy arrangements 
were the workers’ first concerns. In fangzhicheng, two issues emerged. First, how could the nonviable 
Tanghua Group repay the 40 million yuan borrowed from their workers when it was in financial 
difficulties? Second, what should be the levels of compensation for workers with different types of 
labour relationship? As a normal practice, workers who entered the mills before 1987 were classified 
as formal workers (zhengshi gong), otherwise they were contract workers (hetong gong). Besides, the 
mills employed approximately 3,000 seasonal workers from surrounding rural villages. As a 
non-recognized category of state workers, the seasonal workers heard through the grapevine that they 
would have no compensation at all. The workers requested the cadres to address these issues but the 
cadres refused. The non-disclosure set off widespread discontent, resulting in strikes and protests. The 
government and the mills reacted quickly to restore stability by publicizing the bankruptcy 
arrangement within a few days. First, all money borrowed from the workers would be repaid by 
government. Second, the seasonal workers would be offered the same level of compensation as the 
contract workers. While many other SOE reforms and layoffs were conflict ridden (Lee, 2000), 
fangzhicheng was mostly peaceful. These two policies successfully smoothed the implementation of 
layoffs.  
 
Workers were offered three options. First, workers who cease the labour relationship are compensated 
by a one-off buy-out (maiduan) sum depending on the length of service and the type of labour 
relationship (from 1200 to 2500 yuan per working year). Second, workers who retain the relationship 
but have not reached retirement age are offered 280 yuan per month plus superannuation contribution 
until the age of 55, after which they will retire on a pension from the superannuation fund. In the 
meantime, they may be asked to work in the post-reform mills. Third, workers with chronic diseases 
and approved medical records can apply for sick retirement (bingtui).  
 
Compared with some other cases, for instance the No.1 Chongqing Cotton Mill in south-western 
China where laid-off workers were offered a buy-out sum of only 200 to 300 yuan for each working 
year (CLB, 2008b), the governments were relatively generous in the cases of both No.1 Mill and the 
Tanghua Group. However, in light of history in Shaanxi and other provinces, this generosity was not 
offered spontaneously. The reform of textile enterprises has long been sensitive and continues to 
attract unrest nationally (CLB, 2005, 2007a, 2008a, 2009). In the autumn of 2004, textile workers in 
the Tianwang Cotton Mill in Xianyang (originally the No.7 Northwest Cotton Mill) held a seven-week 
strike and blocked the railway and street - possibly the longest and one of the most influential strikes 
in the history of socialist China (CLB, 2004, 2007b). Zhengzhou in Henan Province, another national 
textile base established in the 1950s and bankrupted in early 2008, is a more recent case. Textile 
workers there held several strikes for arrears of superannuation contributions. Unrest and mass 
incidents, which might threaten government officials’ political careers, are something they are most 
unwilling to confront.  
 
Among interviewed workers, it was found that a higher proportion (68 percent) of younger workers 
(under 45) tended to choose the buy-out, while the older ones (within approximately five years to 
retirement age) were more likely to elect to keep the labour relationship. No official statistics are 
available, but it is estimated that in one of the mills, more than half the workers took the first option. A 
43 year-old worker who chose a lump-sum compensation of approximately 62,000 yuan felt regret 
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that she no longer had any relationship with the mill where she had worked for a quarter century. At 
the same time, she felt relieved because her family, with a monthly income of 740 yuan, needed to pay 
the tuition fee for their child in university and the money was of great help. Those who retained the 
relationship did so mainly because it was more feasible to reach the retirement age (hence the 
pension). However, they also worried that the post-bankruptcy mills would request them go back to 
jobs for which they might not be competent due to age or ill health. 
 
4. Defining and characterizing poverty in the study area 
4.1 The official definition of poverty 
 
In 2008, the MLSS poverty threshold in Xi’an was 230 yuan per month per capita. Using this MLSS 
line, the poverty rate in Xi’an was 2.7 percent (MCA, 2009) and that in the sample was approximately 
15 percent. Compared with other industrialized cities where MLSS poverty rate in low-income 
communities was, for example, as high as 20 percent in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province (He et al., 2008), 
35 to 47 percent in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, and in Chongqing Municipality (Cheng, 2010), the 
MLSS poverty rate was relatively moderate in this sample. The BLR that the workers received from 
their affiliated SOEs helped to reduce the MLSS poverty rate. For example, in fangzhicheng, off-post 
workers had been receiving a monthly BLR of 230 yuan from the Tanghua Group between 1999 and 
2008. But the income level in these communities was significantly below the city’s average monthly 
income per capita (1267 yuan), as only 12 percent of the households reached this level, and only 45 
percent of them earned 50 percent of the median income. From a subjective perspective, it was found 
that that approximately 60 percent of households considered themselves poor.  
 
Since its introduction, the implementation of the MLSS has been decentralized to the local department 
of civil affairs and neighbourhood committees, in the expectation that they could address local needs 
efficaciously (Ravallion, 2009). In the sample, nearly 30 percent of the households whose reported 
income was under the MLSS line did not receive transfers because their officially estimated income 
was above the line. The notable differences between the eligibility and actual coverage rates of the 
MLSS, and the subjective poverty rate imply that the official anti-poverty policy did not sufficiently 
address the problem and identify the “genuinely eligible households”, due to mis-targeting or 
mis-measurment (Ravallion, 2008). One reason for such flaws, as Solinger (2008) suggested, is that 
MLSS is designed as a minimum livelihood guarantee to ensure minimal commotion among urban 
residents rather than as a responsible social security program. Poverty, in the implementation of the 
MLSS, is a strictly controlled benefit entitlement. The complicated application process made some 
current and former MLSS recipients dissatisfied, especially with its “surveillance by the masses” 
(qunzhong jiandu) approach to verify applications and its continual supervision of the MLSS 
recipients in an unkind manner: 
 
To decide whether we were eligible, the neighbourhood committee officials visited our flat to 
check everything thoroughly, including our income, savings, consumer durables and housing 
condition. All these details were displayed on the community’s notice board. Everyone read what 
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household appliances I had, how much we earned and how poor we were. That’s a shame and 
we felt really uncomfortable, but we had to accept it.  
 
To a number of poor households we interviewed, poverty was essentially disgraceful. A sense of 
inferiority was also a common reason for them to refuse participation in the research. There is a 
popular viewpoint that poverty is largely attributable to one’s ignorance and indolence. While it is 
generally assumed that any household which is deemed eligible for the MLSS accepts the transfer 
(Ravallion, 2008), occasionally some recipients quit MLSS for “self-esteem” reasons: 
 
One day I met a neighbourhood committee officer on my way home from buying some 
vegetables and meat. He inspected my shopping bag and then criticized me: “You are receiving 
MLSS, why are you buying so much food?”…I quit the MLSS after that. 
 
The MLSS performs relatively well in avoiding leakage to ineligible households (Chen et al., 2006), 
which is also the case in these communities. But the role of front-line executants of the MLSS in this 
regard is largely unheeded. The neighbourhood committee officials were discouraged by the scheme 
as it occupied considerable working time to verify household’s eligibility, to prepare paperwork and to 
update the recipient’s situation regularly. Potential MLSS recipients face an incentive to deliberately 
underreport their income (Ge & Tuan, 2004) and officials may be penalized if they do not successfully 
identify fraudulent applications. The latter are most likely to be submitted by households with income 
at the fringe of the MLSS line. As it is difficult to verify such cases, officials tend to tighten the 
approval rate to avoid such risks. Also, they have no motivation to increase the MLSS standard, as a 
higher line attracts more applications, making their work even more onerous. As in other cities 
(Hussain, 2002), the officials in Xi’an sometimes measure income as if the household was receiving 
all its entitled benefits (e.g. the one-child family allowance to be discussed later), no matter whether 
the family was actually receiving them.  
 
In order to compare it with the MLSS line, we calculated a subjective poverty line based on two 
subjective poverty questions. The first is the Minimum Income Question (MIQ) (Goedhart et al., 1977; 
Kapteyn et al., 1988) with the same wording in Chinese as in Gustafsson et al. (2004): According to 
your actual situation, how much are your minimum household living expenses for a month? The 
second is the so-called Deleek Question (DQ) as explained in Flik and Praag (1991): Can you make 
ends meet with the actual income of your household with great difficulty, difficulty, some difficulty, 
rather easily, easily or very easily? 
 
The respondents marked one category for the DQ which fit their household income best. Then a 
subsample of 200 households comprising those answering “with some difficulty” was constructed. 
Between the minimum income from the MIQ question and the actual household income, which ever 
was lower was defined as the respondents’ lower income. The lower income was used to calculate the 
average poverty threshold and the standard deviation. Those values which differed by more than two 
standard deviations from the average lower income were eliminated in order to reduce the impact of 
outliers. The subjective poverty line using this approach was approximately 380 yuan per month per 
capita, suggesting that the MLSS can cover only 60 percent of the subjective monetary needs of the 
households.  
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4.2 Qualitative assessments of poverty by the communities 
 
An alternative indicator of poverty is the communities’ own assessments of economic welfare and 
identification of poverty attributes. State workers have become poor gradually over time, they 
suggested, due to the SOEs’ financial difficulties, retrenchment program, rising living costs, and age, 
health, occupational skill and social discrimination. We examined these in the framework of PPA in 
which the critical point was to comprehend how poor laid-off workers actually specify poverty. Table 
3 shows how the households who believed themselves poor and found it hard to make ends meet 
defined poverty. Monetary poverty was the dominant characteristic in such definitions but some other 
dimensions were revealed.  Thus, while lack of income and savings topped every group’s indicators 
of poverty, 21 percent of households agreed that having a household member with chronic illness 
created a higher risk of poverty, due to the high health care cost in the current system where they were 
largely unprotected. Overall synthesis of PPA findings implies a certain resignation among 
communities that there was not much they could do to reduce their own poverty.  
 
Table 3: Indicators of poverty 
Indicators of poverty Percentage of households 
Not enough income/savings 70 
Scarcity of food expenditure 30 
Scarcity of necessities 22 
Member with chronic illness 21 
Large household size/high dependence ratio 17 
Poor housing 15 
Materially/monetarily rely on parents/relatives 13 
Poor psychological status 12 
Lack of skills  10 
Other indicators 8 
Source: focus groups and interviews 
 
Each PPA group was asked to scale poverty according to their self-defined characteristics. For 
example, one un-gendered PPA group of laid-off workers categorized households into six groups, 
from the extremely poor to the super rich, according to their mutually agreed well-being standards 
(Table 4). While men and women generally offered similar categories, gendered PPA groups had 
different interpretations due to different focuses on household well-being associated with their roles in 
families. For example, one female group established a connection between the children’s academic 
performance at school, family relationships and the level of overall well-being, while a male group 
particularly stressed the importance of financial capacity in fulfilling household needs and their 
responsibility as household heads. Thus the well-being categorization of households has strong 
contextual meanings and local implications. For example, some small areas were identified by the 
participants as “the corners of the poorest”. Methodologically, this was particularly useful to 
crosscheck with the survey sampling to see whether these locations had been covered. Laid-off 
workers had clear perceptions of relative poverty and deprivation, especially when they compared 
themselves with better-off people outside the communities and with workers in monopoly SOEs.  
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Table 4: Categories and characteristics of household well-being 
Categories Characteristics 
Extremely poor  Living in the shabbiest housing in the north corner of the community, short 
of food and clothing, have member with chronic and costly illness or 
disability and with limited or no working ability, receiving MLSS 
Very poor Similar to the extremely poor but the overall situation is slightly better, 
receiving MLSS 
Normal poor Household members are laid-off, unemployed or work in low-paid and tiring 
jobs, afraid of being sick, strictly control household expenditure, save money 
whenever they can for precautionary reasons 
Marginal (somewhere 
between poor and 
non-poor)  
Very similar to the normal poor, but have a steady job or small business 
although the income is not high 
Better-off (xiaokang) Much better than marginal and have sufficient financial capacity to ensure 
quality of life 
Rich Several former colleagues were in this group but most of them had moved 
out of the communities 
Super rich Those millionaires and billionaires  reported in the media 
Source: focus groups and interviews 
 
Some other understandings of poverty arising from PPAs went well beyond traditional dimensions of 
poverty and were defined in a socio-psychological way. For example, in a PPA in Hanzhong, a laid-off 
worker said: 
 
We were very poor in the Mao era by today’s definition. But I think poverty is not only whether 
we have enough food to eat and enough clothes to wear, but it is also when workers and cadres 
no longer cooperate with one another, when our workers are told that it is our own fault to be 
laid-off and when we lose the advantages we had against other enterprises.  
 
The communities expressed clear ideas of what layoff and poverty meant to them, and these 
understandings had an important dimension of persistence. Poverty experience was described 
primarily as a perpetual need for income and daily necessities. Layoff was a feeling of powerlessness 
and being abandoned, while the difficulty of overcoming poverty and getting new employment was 
particularly stressed. In PPA, participants were asked to nominate the factors that contributed to their 
poverty (Table 5). The Chinese term pinkun corresponding to poverty in English was initially used. 
Like the term “poverty” in English, pinkun also has various meanings and implications. However, as 
arising from the test survey, pinkun generally meant only monetary poverty in some participants’ 
minds. Hence qiong (poor), jiannan (in hardship) and kunnan (in difficult circumatsnce) which denote 
wider implications of both monetary and non-monetary poverty were suggested by them to refer to 
poverty.  
 
Emerging from group discussions, the lack of sufficient income, expenditure and savings are among 
the most frequently mentioned factors. In identifying why layoff caused poverty, the timing of the 
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implementation of the layoff program was often blamed. Almost simultaneously with the layoffs, the 
social security, housing and health care reforms commenced. Not only was income reduced by 50 to 
80 percent, people also had to pay for superannuation and medical care contributions on their own and 
to use savings to purchase the once-free housing.  
 
Nonetheless, the PPAs reflect a greater diversity of livelihoods in different households, especially for 
those who were laid off but were not yet entitled to an age pension. On the one hand, posts available 
to laid-off workers were limited and were mainly manual labour jobs, e.g. cleaners and kitchen hands. 
On the other hand, they had to compete with rural migrants, who were usually younger and healthier. 
According to some small business owners around the communities, laid-off workers were not 
competitive in job-hunting. As most of them were in the age range of 35-50, they were “less energetic 
than young migrant workers” who “ask for less but do more” (Interviews). The laid-off workers felt 
discrimination in the labour market which tended to exclude them from reemployment. Around 65 
percent of the currently unemployed people were willing to work but less than 20 percent of them had 
any confidence that they could find a job. This partially reflects the condition of the job market. An 
owner of printing store said a laid-off worker asked for monthly salary of 650 yuan for operating the 
photocopier but a technical school graduate asked for 500 yuan only and was able to manage both 
photocopying and typing (Interview).  
 
Table 5: Most frequently cited factors contributing to poverty 
Categories Factors contribute to poverty 
Monetary  Insufficient household income due to layoff, poor economic condition of danwei, 
retirement 
Insufficient household savings due to low income, high expenses relative to 
income 
Insufficient household expenditure due to insufficient income, educational, 
medical housing costs (e.g. rent, maintenance and varied housing bills) 
Employment Being unemployed after layoff and forced retirement 
Low salary from new post 
Younger household member cannot find job after graduation from school or 
college 
Unable or unwilling to work due to physical or psychological reasons 
Education and 
skills 
Poor educational background 
Poor technical and professional skills (e.g no skill or professional certificate) 
Have the skills but suffer discrimination in labour market 
Social network No/few friends outside the community (e.g. lack of guanxi and support) 
Loss of face 
Do not visit friends and relatives outside the community 
Housing Damaged and not maintained 
Housing cost is high 
Living space is not enough to comfortably accommodate the household 
Lack of indoor facilities (central heating, gas etc.) 
Source: focus groups and interviews 
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As a Chinese variant of social capital, guanxi played an important role in determining success and 
securing jobs in both the administered economy (Bian, 1994) and the emerging labour market with its 
informational and institutional imperfections (Huang, 2008; Yueh, 2006). Reflecting this, some 
participants recognized the lack of guanxi as one of the major causes of poverty, which they defined 
as absence of good relationships with cadres or “powerful people”. Such relationships had influenced 
the sequence of layoffs within SOEs. As revealed by a former SOE cadre in Hanzhong, in 1995 some 
lower-tier workers were laid off first to fulfil the government’s downsizing quota although the SOE 
was asked to “lay off both workers and cadres to avoid unrest”. In contrast, most of the principal 
cadres and higher-tier workers had kept their jobs until 2002. This seven-year difference meant that 
people laid off in 2002 received approximately 20,000 yuan more than those laid off in 1995, a large 
amount by local standards. Regarding the post-layoff arrangement, one laid-off worker recalled: 
 
The government gave some reemployment posts [to my danwei]. I applied for one, as I was 
qualified…In the end the jobs were given to people who had close relations with cadres…They 
explained to me that it was because I submitted my application late. But how could I apply 
earlier when they kept the information secret until the last minute? In short, I did not have good 
guanxi with cadres. 
 
In these communities, around 65 percent of the laid-off workers who had found jobs had done so 
through the medium of relatives and friends, and only 10 percent through employment agencies. 
Social networks also influenced self-employment activities (Yueh, 2009). Some laid-off workers 
intended to start small businesses, e.g. a snack bar or corner shop; however, it was “complicated” to 
get a licence as several approvals from different governmental departments were required. Simply put, 
“without guanxi, it is hard” to find reemployment (Interview). Guanxi accumulated in one’s earlier 
career is useful to minimize the impacts of layoff, and, though not very common, could enable some 
families to live better after the layoffs. A former front-line marketing officer in Xianyang, for example, 
had not only avoided poverty but also moved to a wealthy community, because he had established a 
strong personal guanxi with suppliers and wholesalers who continued doing business with him after 
his reemployment in a private trade company. By contrast, his superior officer, who had not come into 
contact with business partners and had not directly managed the marketing network, had fallen into 
hardship. We found several similar cases among these SOEs.  
 
Poverty in these communities is a relative concept that changes over time. In the Mao era, as most 
participants agreed, “everyone was poor but happy”. Income was low but the SOE provided 
comprehensive social welfare. After the collapse of the danwei-based welfare provision, the laid-off 
workers have become “poor and unhappy”. They recalled the old time nostalgically, as an era of “no 
corruption and [when] the operation of the danwei was much more transparent”, and when “the 
working class had the highest social standing”. More importantly, they felt organizational 
belongingness as “owners of the enterprise”, a concept that had been strongly advocated by the CCP. 
The subsequent SOE reform deprived them of the internal democracy that had enabled them to voice 
their opinions at the all-staff conference and in the trade union. In response, red or black slogans such 
as “Cadres, do you forget whom the owner of enterprise is?” and “Workers are the collective owner of 
SOE” had been written on walls or on white banners in some SOE communities. However, this did 
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not necessarily mean that these once state workers consistently or completely rejected the SOE reform. 
Rather, it was a means to rationalize and legitimize their resistance, thereby protecting themselves 
from potential political risks.  
 
The nostalgia among workers was obvious. Some workers clearly categorized the Mao era and the 
early post-reform era led by Deng Xiaoping as the best time; however the so-called Third Generation 
of CCP Leadership was deemed the worst. Claiming that the SOE reform and retrenchment are in the 
best interests of nation, the CCP has tried to justify itself as a long-term planner rather than a political 
party of ingratitude. The workers’ strategy was to repeatedly bring up the promises once made by the 
government on guaranteed employment and socio-economic benefits. Protests and petitions are 
frequently held in front of the government buildings of different levels and different departments, with 
varied requests such as for back pay, the pension, retrenchment compensation and other benefits. In 
2008, a small group of laid-off workers established the Shaanxi Study Group on Mao Zedong Thought 
and subsequently a SOE workers’ organization to fight for their rights. In 2009, nearly 200 laid-off 
workers from this group submitted an open letter to the Shaanxi Province Federation of Trade Unions, 
asking for continued benefits and investigation into possible fraud during the restructuring and 
bankruptcy processes of their SOEs. A few days after the submission of this open letter, the 
organization was declared illegal by the government, although generally the authorities have tolerated 
such activities if there was no radical behaviour or violence (STGMT, 2009a, 2009b). As stated by 
one government official dealing with workers’ requests, these activities barely had any influence 
because “if they could get them [the claimed benefits], they would have them already. [Protests and 
petitions] normally do not work” (Interview). 
 
Some laid-off workers blamed the cadres for their hardship. Many workers alleged that the managers 
had problems of corruption, malfeasance, mismanagement, dereliction of duty, and illegally or 
cheaply selling of state- or collective-owned assets to private enterprises. Corruption was the focus 
but only a few workers could present any (not very convincing) proof. As high-tier cadres formed a 
small clique, outsiders like ordinary workers could only observe their activities distantly. But workers 
insisted that their complaints and suspicions were well grounded. One stated: 
 
Some cadres have personal drivers and cars...They spend enterprise funds to eat outside…Some 
of them have two or three apartments…They travelled abroad several times last year, saying 
that they were negotiating contracts with machinery manufacturers…But we don’t see any new 
equipment…When we ask for unpaid wages, pensions and reimbursement of medical costs, the 
answers are always “Danwei is in difficulty”, “No money”, “Be patient” and “We will research 
it”…But where are the funds for their dissipation from? 
 
Challenging and impeaching the cadres is one the most radical ways for workers to fight for rights and 
benefits. Since the mid 1990s, in a COE with around 100 staff, opposition to the director assigned by 
its managing SOE has lasted for more than fifteen years. Since the management refused to contribute 
to workers’ superannuation, unemployment and medical insurance, some retirees had no pension and 
no workers had medical insurance. Most workers were laid off without compensation in the late 1990s. 
In the mid 2000s, the workers legally dismissed the director through the all-staff conference, but he 
has refused to hand over the management. Since then the workers have spent six years appealing to 
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the higher authority in Beijing for “justice” (see Sun (2008) for an extraordinary account of her own 
and her fellow workers’ fight for their legal entitlements, endangering their lives during the reform of 
their COE in Xi’an). 
 
In the context of post-paternalism, the danwei system and its superior administration, have been 
urging the workers to “look for [help from] the market rather than the mayor (bu zhao shizhang zhao 
shichang)”. To encourage the recruitment of laid-off workers, governments reduce or exempt their 
employers from tax. However some employers pay the laid-off workers a few hundred yuan and list 
them on the payroll to take advantage of the policy without actually requiring them to work.  
 
A number of institutions suggested by the residents themselves were analysed in PPAs. Table 6 is an 
example showing the perspectives of residents on institutions which have been involved in poverty 
alleviation and related matters. Laid-off workers were deeply disappointed by the fact that the 
influence of danwei-related institutions was decreasing. But some of them continued to hope that 
danwei and the state would compensate their sacrifices and efforts in the earlier years.  
 
Table 6: Institutional analysis on poverty alleviation 
Institutions Selected comments 
Neighbourhood committee:  
a grass-roots  
local-governance  
organization  
that links the bureaucracy  
and the community 
1. Most resident have no contact with the officials there    
2. Used to be a place for occasional community gatherings and was 
the organizer of informal social events, but now more likely to be a 
completely governmental and bureaucratic agent  
3. MLSS recipients: Initial contact point for personal or family 
difficulties but not much extra help could be attained from it in 
reality 
(Original) Danwei 1. Usually have little contact Some had no contact with it for many 
years 
2. Hope the danwei could at least think of them 
Reemployment service centre  
and skills training centre 
1. Offered some advice and training 
2. Could not provide enough good employment opportunities 
3. Poor service and impatience with workers’ queries 
The Trade Union 1. Helped a lot of workers experiencing difficulties in the early 
years and served as the link between workers and cadres (e.g. gave 
out presents and allowances on holidays) although it could not really 
represent the workers (comment by a retired Trade Union Chair) 
2. Now totally the puppet of the enterprise management and 
government 
Source: focus groups and interviews 
 
Previous research shows that the state’s monopoly over the provision of re-employment services had 
crowed out independent providers (Smyth et al., 2001). While this situation still exists, local 
governments have recently outsourced occupational skill training to private providers. Overall, 
however, the effect was unclear as observed in the fieldwork. In fangzhicheng, a private training 
school provided free courses in computing, accounting and handicrafts. Its principal claimed that the 
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output was significant in terms of “getting reemployed” as the school also acted as an employment 
agency (Interview). The claim was dubious, as the school’s staff instead referred to “humble posts”, 
e.g. cleaner, supermarket cashier, kitchen hand and restaurant waiter, as being most commonly 
provided and also the least welcome since they were “tiring, dirty and not worth it” (Interview). At the 
same time, the school principal was severely critical of laid-off workers: 
 
Retrenchment of SOE workers is inevitable in the market economy. In this position, I have met 
and taught a large number of laid-off workers. If a laid-off worker is in good health and not a 
basket case, he or she should not be in poverty. A lot of jobs are available in the communities 
and in the city centre. How could so many migrant-workers survive in the cities? Laid-off 
workers who are holding urban hukou (household registration), enjoying social security, and 
living in apartments should think about why they do not live much better than the 
labour-migrants? Obviously, a job, no matter what kind of job, could get them out of poverty or 
at least improve their living conditions. But frankly they are just indolent about everything.  
 
5. Quantitative analysis of survey data 
 
The above two sections have analysed how the textile and military SOEs in Shaanxi Province have 
fallen into a decline, and have used PPA and interviews to gather the residents’ perceptions of layoffs 
and poverty, and other relevant aspects. These findings point to the applicability of qualitative 
methods for understanding local poverty dynamics and for the objective to reach the laid-off workers 
in a contextual research design. PPA and interviews enabled the expression of complex poverty issues 
and raised sensitive issues. In the PPA, participants had opportunities to generate debates and 
discussions about their communities. Typical or extreme cases arising in the PPA were followed up by 
interviews.  
 
While the PPA provides more contextualized or individualized experiences and explanations of 
poverty and layoffs, quantitative methods have the advantage of gaining comprehensive information, 
including more variants in the analysis and standardizing the study for the purpose of future 
comparative study. Given the relatively large numbers involved in household survey, the information 
revealed in statistical description and analysis is more representative and is better able to 
systematically account for relations and interaction between certain variables than the  PPA. The 
usefulness of PPA practices is in debates. There is no doubt that PPA contributes to relative 
assessments of poverty within a given SOE community, but it is difficult to compare different PPA 
results across communities because of the meanings attached to them is sometimes different. 
Quantitative methods, in this regard, are a good complement.  
 
Table 7 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample households in Xi’an. Compared with the 
official statistics of Xi’an, the households were slightly smaller in size but significantly disadvantaged. 
The average household size was 2.88 and the most typical household size was three people (43.9 
percent), close to the city-wide household size (2.91). Compared with the official figure of 1.39 
members employed in each household, households in these communities averaged less than one 
employed member (0.79). Unemployment was a major problem, as identified in the PPA, and is also 
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demonstrated in the quantitative data: nearly half of the households had no employed person, while 
another 31.7 percent of households had only one member in employment. The 
employed-to-household size ratio (25.7%) was much lower than at the city level (47.8%).  
 
More than 60 percent of the sample households had at least one laid-off worker. It should be noted 
that during the survey, retrenchment in some SOEs was still in progress and some workers had not 
decided which compensation option to take. While their laid-off or unemployed status was not yet 
finally confirmed, the number of households with laid-off workers would have increased during 2009. 
The number of retired household members was also higher than in the city-wide statistics at 0.86, 
meaning that a higher proportion of household members in these communities was out of the labour 
market. The majority of laid-off heads comprised ordinary workers (82.1 percent), while cadres and 
technicians were a small proportion. Although the average number of years of service was long (28.8 
years), the cadres were mostly in the lowest bureaucratic ranking (73%), 55 percent of non-cadre 
heads had no skill ranking and only a few had obtained registration as a technician. Most heads had 
worked previously in SOEs, COEs and other state sector jobs, although the non-state sector provided 
the largest proportion of employment in Xi’an. In other words, compared to the population of the city 
as a whole, the sample population had been more severely affected by the recent industrial 
restructuring.  
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Table 7: Household characteristics 
 Sample Xi’an* 
Household size (mean) 2.88 2.91 
1 person 10.0%  
2 people 9.8%  
3 people 43.9%  
4 people 13.6%  
5 people and more 8.7%  
Employed people (mean) 0.79  1.39 
None 46.0%  
1 person 31.7%  
2 people 19.9%  
3 people and more 2.4%  
Employed-to-household size ratio 25.7% 47.8% 
Household members with income 1.60  2.07 
Member with income except head and spouse   
Yes 27.5%  
1 person 64.0%  
2 people 29.0%  
3 people and more 7.0%  
No 72.5%  
Laid-off workers (mean) 0.54  
None 39.3%  
1 person 48.9%  
2 people 10.9%  
3 people and more 0.9%  
Retired (mean persons) 0.86  0.60 
None 59.5%  
1 person 38.7%  
2 people and more 1.8%  
Preschool (mean persons) 0.10   
In education (mean persons) 0.43  
Chronic illness (mean persons) 0.21  
Occupation of head   
Farmer (seasonal worker) 3.8%  
Ordinary worker 82.1%  
Cadre 5.9%  
Technician 4.8%  
Others 3.4%  
Employment sector of head   
SOE 87.0%  
COE 5.9%  
Other state sector 2.8%  
Others 4.3%  
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Source: Author’s calculation; Note: * Official statistics from Shaanxi Statistical Yearbook, 2008. 
 
While the households in Xi’an had an average of 2.07 members with income, the figure for the sample 
households was only 1.6. Household heads and their spouses were the main source of income for 82.5 
percent of households, and only 27.5 percent received income from a member other than the head or 
spouse. City-wide, the average monthly salary for an employed person was 1,775 yuan, but in the 
sample average monthly income of household heads was just 720 yuan – a nearly 60 percent 
difference. Income per capita for Xi’an households was 897 yuan, but only 570 yuan - about 40 
percent less - in the sample.  
 
In terms of consumption, the households’ average monthly food expenditure per capita was 223 yuan, 
only slightly below the city average of 255 yuan, implying a higher proportion of income was spent 
on food than for normal households in Xi’an. The households also spent much less on other items. 
They were asked to rank their largest expenditures. Food, electricity, water and gas, education, and 
medical expenses were among the largest expenses while expenditure on entertainment, clothes and 
shoes, housing, and transportation were smaller. For example, the households spent only 246 yuan per 
capita per year on clothes and shoes, which was only 27 percent of the city figure. Lower income and 
consumption among households was accompanied by the lack of other family assets, and many 
households did not own any valuables. About 53 percent of households had no savings, while among 
those who did, the most common amount was under 5,000 yuan. This was significantly lower than the 
savings per capita of urban residents in Xi’an, which averaged 11,412 yuan (Table 8). Of the sample 
households, nearly half saw improvement in nominal income over the previous three years. However, 
66.7 percent of them had experienced a deterioration in real income, due to the rapid inflation 
between 2006 and mid-2008. At the same time, approximately 70 percent of households saw no 
change or deterioration in their standard of living (Table 9).  
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Table 8: Savings among households (yuan) 
 Percentage 
Have savings 47 
Under 5,000 21 
5,000-10,000 11 
10,000-20,000 7 
20,000-30,000 3 
30,000-40,000 2 
40,000-50,000 2 
Over 50,000 1 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Table 9: Change of household income and standard of living in the last three years (percentage) 
 Household income 
(nominal) 
Household income (real) Standard of living 
Significantly improved 6.4 4.0 3.3 
Slightly improved 42.9 7.3 26.1 
Almost no change 36.7 22.0 39.4 
Slightly deteriorated 7.7 40.7 19.0 
Significantly deteriorated 6.2 26.0 12.2 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Average age of the sample housing stock, which mainly dated from the pre-reform era, was 31years. 
The housing space per capita (19.4 m2) was below the city level (23.6 m2) and the number of rooms 
per capita was 0.62. Unlike similar communities in some other cities, where construction of the vast 
majority of housing was strictly controlled by the danwei, (Wu et al., 2010), 22.3 percent of the 
housing in our sample communities had been built by households themselves in a loosened housing 
management system in the pre-reform era. Danwei housing was, however, still the main source (75 
percent). The so-called zijian cun (self-built villages) or penghu qu (shanty towns) were crudely built, 
short of basic infrastructure, and their deterioration was even more serious than that of the SOE-built 
housing. Only 13 percent of households fully owned their house, while, 64 percent partially owned it 
and 19 percent had no ownership. Those who had purchased their house from the danwei had spent 
approximately 24,000 yuan, a heavily discounted price compared with the city’s average purchasing 
price of 48,147 yuan.  
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Table 10: Housing characteristics 
Average housing age (years) 31 
Housing space per capita (m2) 19.4 
Rooms per capita 0.62 
Construction type of housing (percentage)  
Self-built/one-storey housing 22.3 
Danwei dormitory (shared toilets, kitchen etc.) 9.1 
Danwei built and allocated housing 65.9 
Others 2.7 
Ownership of housing (percentage)  
Fully owned 13.4 
Partially owned 64.0 
Not owned 19.0 
Others 3.6 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Table 11: Degree of satisfaction (percentage) 
 Strongly 
satisfied 
Satisfied Neutral Unsatisfied Strongly 
unsatisfied 
No idea 
House space 3.5 19.1 23.2 36.2 17.8 0.2 
House structure 2.0 19.5 27.2 37.5 13.8 0 
Indoor facilities 0.9 23.1 34.3 9.9 0.2 0 
House location 6.8 45.8 32.7 11.8 2.9 0 
Neighbourhood 
relations 
19.8 59.3 16.0 2.9 1.3 0.6 
Community safety 1.8 24.3 35.1 26.1 12.3 0.4 
Community services 0.7 23.5 41.4 19.7 7.5 7.2 
Transportation 9.4 64.9 17.8 5.9 1.1 0.9 
Primary school 2.2 34.2 24.1 12.1 5.9 21.5 
Secondary school 1.8 30.7 23.0 13.4 5.9 25.2 
Food market 2.6 56.8 19.5 17.3 3.3 0.4 
Shops 2.9 58.8 23.0 12.7 1.3 1.3 
Medical service 2.6 46.4 26.6 16.3 7.3 0.9 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
The questionnaire collected data on the degree of satisfaction at household level on a number of items 
(Table 11). For instance, many households were not satisfied with their house space and structure, but 
were more satisfied with its indoor facilities and location. Transportation, food market, shops and 
medical services all achieved high degrees of satisfaction. Neighbourhood relations were particularly 
good in these communities where the residents worked (or had worked) together in the same SOEs 
and knew each other well. 
    
The above data concerned subjective observations of income and consumption status, but based on the 
monetary dimension of poverty. In the following we exclude the direct monetary measures of 
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well-being by introducing a subjective assessment of poverty, constructed according to answers (1 for 
“Yes” and 0 for “No”) to the question: 
 
Taking into account your material conditions, do you consider yourself in poverty? 
 
Interviewees were then asked about their perception of the gap between (1) themselves and others 
around them (self versus others), (2) their current achievements and earlier hopes for their present 
stage of life (past versus current), and (3) what they hoped to achieve in their lifetime (current versus 
future). Answers were based on a scale from 1 to 7 (Tables 12 and 13). Opinions were sought on 
health, income, career and family relationships for each perception gap. These aspects have previously 
been shown to be important in the study of subjective well-being (SWB) in China and other countries 
as well (Brockmann et al., 2008; Camfield et al., 2009; Nielsen et al., 2010; Schimmel, 2009; 
Winkelmann, 2008). The inclusion of these aspects was also suggested by the local residents in the 
test survey who considered them crucial in the context of reduced income, rising health costs, ruined 
career progression and loss of job, and worsening family relationships (a core value of Chinese 
culture) for many laid-off workers’ households.   
 
Table 12: Types of perception gap 
Perception gaps Questions and aspects 
Self vs. others (Gap 1) Compared with people around you, how do you 
evaluate your current health, income, career and 
family relationships? 
Past vs. current (Gap 2) Compared with your earlier expectations and 
aspirations, how do you evaluate your current 
health, income, career and family relationships? 
Current vs. future (Gap 3) Compared with your lifetime expectations and 
aspirations, how do you evaluate your current 
health, income, career and family relationship? 
 
 
Table 13: Scales of perception gap 
Very far 
below 
Considerably 
below 
Slightly 
below 
Basically 
the same 
Slightly 
above 
Considerably 
above 
Very far 
above 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
In analysing our results, poverty is expressed as a function of these perception gaps, a vector of 
demographic and personal variables, a vector of controlling variables and a vector of variables for 
controlling the respondents’ state of mind bias. A probit model is run, as the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, and the model in general is: 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖
𝑔 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑒𝑟.𝑖+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛.𝑖+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑀𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (1) 
 
Here 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 equals 1 if individual i is in poverty and 0 otherwise, where t stands for the type of 
poverty, i.e. subjective poverty, MLSS poverty and relative poverty. 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖
𝑔 is a vector for perceived 
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gap variables, where g stands for the type of gap. 𝑃𝑒𝑟.𝑖  are demographic variables and 𝐶𝑜𝑛.𝑖 
controls for individual variables (occupation, age, education, income, assets). 𝑆𝑀𝑖  is a vector 
consisting of variables controlling for the state of mind to prevent variations in measures of SWB 
(Layard, 2005). 
  
Since some people who are income poor do not subjectively consider themselves poor, the model also 
regresses conditionally on MLSS poverty (i.e. 230 yuan per month per capita) and relative poverty (i.e. 
50 percent of median monthly income, approximately 530 yuan) to examine whether there are 
differences in the significance of gaps in testing the probability of self-perceived poverty when 
someone is income poor in the following functions: 
 
Both objectively and subjectively poor 
𝑂𝑏𝑗. & 𝑆𝑢𝑏.𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖 = α + 𝛽1𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖
𝑔 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑒𝑟.𝑖+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛.𝑖+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑀𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (1) 
 
Not objectively but subjectively poor  
𝑆𝑢𝑏.𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦𝑖 = α + 𝛽1𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖
𝑔 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑒𝑟.𝑖+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛.𝑖+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑀𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (2) 
 
Using probit regression, equation (1) is estimated for each poverty indicator (subjective, MLSS and 
relative) as a function of the different gaps described in Table 12. Two conditional probit regressions 
for 2.1 and 2.2 are also estimated on MLSS and relative poverty. 
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Table 14: Probit regression results for gaps (marginal effects) 
Variables Model 1  
(Unconditional) 
Model 2  
(Subjective poverty conditional regressions) 
    MLSS Relative 
 Subjective MLSS Relative Not poor Poor Not poor Poor 
Gap 1: self vs. others 
Health  -0.023* -0.123 -0.045 0.012 -0.123** 0.021 -0.173** 
 (0.003) (0.022) (0.110) (0.003) (0.114) (0.003) (0.114) 
Income -0.056* -0.023** -0.045 -0.056** -0.023 -0.106** -0.023 
 (0.003) (0.023) (0.032) (0.071) (0.152) (0.021) (0.132) 
Career -0.120* 0.017 -0.035 -0.120 -0.017* -0.134 -0.015* 
 (0.058) (0.034) (0.008) (0.058) (0.034) (0.058) (0.034) 
Family rel. -0.219* -0.045 -0.008 -0.079 -0.765** -0.029 -0.665** 
 (0.034) (0.023) (0.003) (0.289) (0.023) (0.156) (0.134) 
R-Squared 0.117 0.127 0.182 0.122 0.212 0.111 0.121 
Gap 2: past vs. current 
Health  0.012* 0.894 0.457 0.056 0.266** 0.445 0.235** 
 (0.455) (0.323) (0.232) (0.445) (0.568) (0.262) (0.222) 
Income -0.124* -0.158 -0.089 -0.568* -0.154 -0.227* -0.458 
 (0.012) (0.458) (0.556) (0.265) (0.154) (0.221) (0.155) 
Career -0.148* -0.457 -0.000 0.789 -0.466* 0.007 -0.225 
 (0.112) (0.304) (0.018) (0.438) (0.443) (0.310) (0.123) 
Family rel. -0.220* -0.156 -0.258 -0.086 -0.269** -0.020 -0.665** 
 (0.213) (0.343) (0.744) (0.344) (0.441) (0.423) (0.352) 
R-Squared 0.182 0.173 0.201 0.198 0.122 0.129 0.217 
Gap 3: current vs. future 
Health  0.310** 0.131 0.124 0.245* 0.529* 0.213* 0.623** 
 (0.078) (0.072) (0.120) (0.008) (0.417) (0.323) (0.304) 
Income -0.456* -0.652 -0.478 -0.771 -0.998** -0.506 -0.723** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.045) (0.018) (0.055) (0.121) (0.130) 
Career 0.312 0.229 0.285 0.535 0.454 0.234 0.568 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.056) (0.044) 
Family rel. -0.129* -0.045 -0.048 -0.089* -0.228* -0.217* -0.341* 
 (0.024) (0.052) (0.053) (0.019) (0.023) (0.056) (0.040) 
R-Squared 0.223 0.290 0.167 0.231 0.234 0.233 0.211 
Source: Author’s calculation; Notes:  1. Results for controlling variables are omitted here; 2. 
*denotes statistical significance at the 95% and ** at the 90% levels; 3. Figures in parenthesis are 
standard errors. 
 
Table 14 presents results from the three specifications. From the results for Gap 1, the health gap 
significantly explains changes in the probability of being poor in Model 1 and it is also significant in 
Model 2 for MLSS and relative poverty, implying that good health is important to avoid monetary 
poverty and that with better health, the probability of self-perceived poverty decreases. In Model 1, 
the income gap is significant in explaining both subjective poverty (at the 5 percent level) and MLSS 
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(at the 10 percent level), but not relative poverty, indicating that the subjective standard has better 
performance in capturing poverty. The perception gaps in career and family relations are significant in 
the subjective poverty unconditional regression (Model 1) and for the MLSS and relative poverty in 
Model 2. These results show that a person who has better family relations relative to others is less 
likely to be subjectively poor and people experiencing monetary poverty will not consider themselves 
poor if they have a smaller job gap.  
 
From results for Gap 2, health and family relationship gaps are significant in Model 1 and significant 
in Model 2 among MLSS and the relatively poor, implying that worse health and family relations 
increase the probability of self-perceived poverty. Income gap is significant in Model 1, implying that 
smaller the gap between a person’s current income and the aspired income, the less opportunity the 
person will be in self-perceived poverty. In Model 2, among the income non-poor, income gaps are 
significant and provide the same implications. Regarding career gap, the marginal effect is significant 
among the unconditional subjective poor and the income poor in conditional MLSS poverty. This 
means that improvement in a person’s career relative to what the person aspired to achieve decreases 
the probability of falling into subjective poverty.  
 
From results for Gap 3, health and family relationship gaps are significant in Model 1 and Model 2 
among both poor and non-poor. Improving these factors helps decrease the possibility of being 
subjectively poor. In regard to income, if a person has already achieved a level greater than that the 
person considers to be sufficient for a life-time, the probability of being subjectively poor decreases. 
Marginal effects of career gap are not significant in either model, possibly due to the laid-off workers 
not having a clear expectation of the future after the layoff had demolished their career prospects.  
 
Generally speaking, subjective indicators are more effective in capturing the importance of gaps than 
monetary poverty standards as the gaps were more significant in a person’s subjective poverty 
assessment while they were not relevant to the objective poverty specifications. For instance, health 
gaps are significant in explaining subjective poverty while objective indicators cannot significantly 
capture it. In reality, a healthier person would have a better chance of being employed, a higher 
income and less expenditure on health issues.  
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6. Some hidden aspects of poverty 
Survey methods that aim at standardization can obtain a common set of information and avoid 
possible bias arising from face-to-face interviews. But in many contexts, surveys are “less suited to 
gathering information that is highly nuanced or covers intangibles” (Appleton & Booth, 2005). The 
particular strength of qualitative methods in poverty studies is that they enrich information obtained 
by quantitative methods and obtain detailed information that surveys are normally unable to do. The 
following are some examples. 
 
Time-limited tap water supply  
Surprising results were not expected on whether or not the households have access to tap water in the 
survey area. The data show that all households had access to tap water. But it was subsequently found, 
in qualitative phase, that in fangzhicheng, water was supplied only three times a day in the morning, 
noon and night, lasting between one and four hours each time. The lack of persistent water supply 
interrupted residents’ daily activities and adversely affected public sanitation as some of the 
households shared a lavatory. The explanations from residents and officials on this issue were very 
different. One resident said:  
 
This community is eligible to be connected directly to the city’s water supply network, but it is 
not. The danwei built a hydraulic pressure system between the residential area and the city 
network; and it charges us the cost of water re-pressurizing. However, an air lock fills the water 
pipe during idle hours between service times. When we turn on the tap, the air comes out first, 
and then it runs the meter for several minutes, which means we have to pay for the air! Here the 
air is the same price as water! 
 
Officials strongly denied this criticism and imputed this problem to the surface water shortage in the 
district and the area’s higher elevation than its surroundings. The majority of water was supplied by 
wells dug and managed by the danwei. Hence water (re)pressurizing was necessary to boost the 
groundwater to the residential areas. The 1.5 times over-exploitation of fangzhicheng’s groundwater 
has caused environment degeneration, including groundwater-level drawdown and the abandonment 
of more than 40 wells. In some communities, the water table has been falling at the speed of 2.5 
metres per year. Hopefully this problem can be solved in 2012 when a nearby dam is completed. Until 
then, the only way is to deepen the wells. Nonetheless, this issue has been widely used by the 
residents as evidence of hencha de shequ (a very bad community). There was no communication 
between residents and officials on disputable issues like this. Actually, as a typical danwei-run society, 
not only water supply but also roads, heating and power supply in fangzhicheng were mainly built and 
maintained by the danwei themselves. Isolation from the city’s public services has created an area that 
has benefited less from rapid urban development. In the words of a local resident, “now fangzhicheng 
almost looks like it was 20 years ago” and the danwei was not able to maintain the facilities due to 
financial difficulties. 
 
House ownership  
A significant proportion (approximately 70 percent) of the households purchased their houses between 
the late 1990s and early 2000s as a result of the privatization of housing. They allegedly fully owned 
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the house. However, only 13 percent of them have received the ownership certificate, the only legal 
authentication for them to sell or mortgage their house, or secure a loan from the bank to support a 
small business and so on. But there was little dissatisfaction among households who largely accepted 
the fact. Two typical answers were: 
 
We have tried [to obtain the ownership certificate] but the relevant government departments 
asked us to wait….Then we have waited for 8 years….But that’s fine, no one will take my house 
away, I think. 
 
The danwei asked me to talk to the government and the government said the danwei should help 
us because our houses used to be danwei-owned properties. I was exhausted after trying several 
times ,so I gave up and just left the problem there…Many people have the same problem, not 
only in our danwei. It makes no difference to our family anyway.  
 
Central heating fee 
The commencement of fieldwork was just at the time when the neighbourhood committees began to 
collect a heating fee from households. Because a public heating system was used, there was no 
individual meter for each house. Hence the heating fee was shared by households depending on the 
space of each house. The households strongly challenged the rules: 
 
Until last year, the amount of heating fee was charged depending on the number of heating 
radiators in each house. However, this year we were charged according to the size of house and 
shared area. There is only one radiator in my house and we do not feel warm but we have to pay 
double price and even for the shared space and stairway where there are no radiators. 
 
A protest was proposed in one of the communities and some residents claimed that they would refuse 
to pay the fee. Actually, the central heating fee was a hot topic throughout the cities in early winter, as 
we observed from local websites, television programs, and newspapers. The laid-off workers were 
more concerned about the pricing policy while the residents in wealthier communities cared more 
about the heating temperature, in other words, the quality of central heating.  
 
Living support  
Besides MLSS and BLR, a number of gongyixing gangwei (waged jobs for people who serve the 
community) were provided as a supplementary measure to support the laid-off workers, the disabled 
and so forth in these communities. The roles normally comprised patrolling, cleaning, or assisting 
with office work in the neighbourhood committee.1
                                                        
1 The qualifications for this post vary between cities. In Xi’an, to qualify for a gongyixing gangwei one must 
be: (1) a “zero-employment” family; (2) female over 40 or male over 50, with a Certificate of 
Reemployment; (3) unemployed person receiving Minimum Living Standard support; (4) Both husband and 
wife are laid-off or unemployed; (5) Single-parent with minor; (6) Disabled person with working ability; (7) 
Spouse of an active member of the army, retired army or family member of a revolutionary martyr and (8) 
Other laid-off and unemployed person in special hardship. 
 In return, a monthly salary of around 760 yuan 
was paid. A resident brought an accusation against the selection process of gongyixing gangwei and 
the duties he had had to fulfil: 
 32 
 
Look at the people the neighbourhood committee has employed in gongyixing gangwei. The 
majority are their relatives or friends or those who have a good guanxi with the high-level 
cadres….I got the job last winter as a disabled laid-off worker, but I resigned after several 
months….I was asked to sweep the snow in winter but I found it really undoable, because my 
back and legs were too painful.  
 
Microcredit 
Governments have been encouraging the laid-off workers to actively participate in private business 
which they deem to be the most effective absorbent of laid-off workers. The stimuluses have included 
an initial three year tax holiday for any laid-off worker who starts an eligible small business, 
microcredit,2 and tax reduction for businesses that employ laid-off workers, as mentioned earlier. 
Clearly these policies were designed to stir up reemployment. However, to be eligible for the first two 
preferential policies, a laid-off worker must have obtained a Priority Certificate for Reemployment, 
and at the same time must give up MLSS benefits. Therefore, some laid-off workers who were 
receiving the MLSS hesitated to apply for the Certificate.3
 
 Local authorities reported some success 
stories at the time of the fieldwork, though compared with the massive number of laid-off workers, 
these cases were very few. One laid-off worker had already owned a coach running between two cities 
in Shaanxi, before he obtained microcredit. The purpose of applying for the loan was to improve his 
turnover. Starting a private business, even the smallest of its type, was not a task one resident of a 
five-person family with three laid-off workers could undertake confidently:   
I had thought about it - open a corner store or kiosk selling local snacks - but I worried about 
what I would have to face. If we failed, it would definitely throw us into a worse situation. 
 
Another laid-off worker was concerned about the security of business activity from her own 
experience: 
 
I sold liangpi [a traditional cheaply priced fast food] in the community during the summer, but 
the experience was terrible as several extortionists who were also drug addicts took my 
hard-earned money. 
   
To most of the laid-off workers, applying for the microcredit to start a home-based business was not 
on their schedule and only a few would really like to take it up. Even so, only around 30 percent of 
applications were approved in Xi’an. The dissemination of the idea of starting a small business 
through community meetings, road shows and free training had no significant effect in persuading the 
laid-off workers.  
 
One child allowance 
                                                        
2 The loan amount is normally between 20,000 to 30,000 yuan. The repayment period is normally 2 years, 
with a possible extension of 1 year. During the normal repayment period, the interest generated will be 
paid by the Central Government. 
3 There have been recent changes to this policy, as in some cities government relief recipients can now 
also apply for microcredit.  
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In one of the communities, we saw a copy of a petition from a group of laid-off workers asking for the 
one child allowance. It contained dozens of signatures, and had already been sent to numerous 
governmental departments at different levels. In order to encourage the workers to have one child only 
and to reduce their reluctance to implement the policy, the government had promised that people 
would be entitled to an allowance of 5 percent of their retirement pension, or about 30-50 yuan per 
month in 2008. It was a very small amount, but of considerable importance to poor laid-off workers.  
 
In some other communities only a small number of eligible workers, who had retired before 2007, had 
received the allowance. As the pension varied greatly between different enterprises and between 
workers and cadres, some received a few hundred yuan, while others received only 20. A new 
allowance policy issued by the provincial government abrogates the disparity. However, as of January 
2010, the workers in that community had not received anything, as the final standard had not been 
released. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper addresses urban poverty in Shaanxi Province, where reconstruction of its state sector has 
deeply influenced former state workers, by using a mixed methods approach. By combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods I have demonstrated that these workers and their families have 
been negatively affected by retrenchment and continuing inability to benefit from China’s economic 
reforms. Beyond this simple insight, however, I showed that the combination of objective and 
subjective poverty analysis enables us to see the problem in a dynamic and contextual way.  
 
The military and textile industries, as two of the most typical and established industries in the Shaanxi 
Province, have undergone u-shaped development during their histories. Established in the early 
socialist era, military and textile enterprises were ideal workplaces for urban residents. With the 
support from government, their economic performance peaked in the early reform era, i.e. the 1980s 
and early 1990s, during which time economic risks were overlooked. Later, the changes in 
macroeconomic policy, the downturn of the textile market and the changes brought about by 
post-Cold War international relations, compelled the industries to reform themselves. While the 
government initially stuck to its policy of saving the SOEs, these attempts were ultimately 
unsuccessful. Poverty emerged as social welfare provision by the SOEs and the state lagged behind 
needs in a rapidly changing economy. Under political pressure, some SOEs and the local government 
offered better compensation and options to the workers relative to other similar textile mills in China.  
 
From a policy standpoint, I showed that the MLSS as a monetary measure of well-being has not yet 
been able to provide sufficient support for the poor, as a subjective poverty line approach shows that 
the MLSS underestimates the needs of poor households. Moreover, due to its harsh qualification 
standards and focus on identifying fraudulent applications, it does not reach all of the extremely poor. 
By comparison, the PPA results illustrate the dynamic and contextual understanding of poverty, layoff 
and livelihoods by poor themselves. Survey data of communities revealed that the households had 
fewer employed and more unemployed members, who were also more likely to be disfavoured in the 
labour market due to age, ill health and low skill levels. The surveyed households experienced 
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nominal household income increases which were offset or more than offset by inflation.  
 
By examining the relationship between perception gaps and subjective poverty, we found that these 
gaps matter in households’ subjective assessments of well-being, while monetary measures are less 
able to capture these key elements. Clearly, the differences between the “objective” poverty line 
measures and people’s subjective assessments of their situation are likely to have implications for the 
unrest that has been experienced in danwei communities. The mixed methods approach has also 
helped to reveal hidden aspects of poverty, not normally captured in quantitative surveys.  In 
particular, evidence from the qualitative research suggests that policies aimed at supporting laid-off 
workers have often been poorly implemented and poorly targeted. Therefore research on China’s 
urban poverty needs to take a more multidimensional direction, at a higher level of methodological 
integration, and to interact more closely with the poor. 
  
 35 
References 
 
Adato, Michelle. (2007). Combining survey and ethnographic methods to evaluate conditional cash 
transfer programs. Centre for International Studies (University of Toronto) Q-Squared 
Working Paper, No.40. 
ADB (Asian Development Bank). (2004). Poverty profiles of the People's Republic of China. 
Retrieved from http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Poverty_Profile_PRC/PRC.pdf on 22 
August 2008. 
Addison, Tony, David Hulme & Ravi Kanbur (Eds.). (2009). Poverty Dynamics: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Appleton, Simon & David Booth. (2005). Combining participatory and survey-based approaches to 
poverty monitoring and analysis. Centre for International Studies (University of Toronto) 
Q-Squared Working Paper Q-Squared Working Paper, No.14. 
Appleton, Simon, Lina Song & Qingjie Xia. (2008). Growing out of poverty: trends and patterns of 
urban poverty in China 1988-2002. IZA Working Paper, No. 3459. 
Bergman, Manfred Max. (2008). Advances in Mixed Methods Research. London: SAGE. 
Bian, Yanjie. (1994). Guanxi and the allocation of urban jobs in China. The China Quarterly, 140, 
971-999. 
Bishop, John A., Feijun Luo & Xi Pan. (2006). Economic transition and subjective poverty in China. 
Review of Income and Wealth, 52(4), 625-641. 
Brockmann, Hilke, Jan Delhey, Christian Welzel & Hao Yuan. (2008). The China puzzle: falling 
happiness in a rising economy. Journal of Happiness Studies, 10(4), 387-405. 
Cai, Fang, Albert Park & Yaohui Zhao. (2008). The Chinese labor market in the reform era. In Loren 
Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski (Eds.), China's Great Economic Transformation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Cai, Y. (2002). The resistance of Chinese laid-off workers in the reform period. The China Quarterly, 
170(2), 327-344. 
Camfield, Laura, Kaneta Choudhury & Joe Devine. (2009). Well-being, happiness and why 
relationships Matter: evidence from Bangladesh. Journal of Happiness Studies, 10(1), 71-91. 
Carvalho, Soniya & Howard White. (1997). Combining the quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
poverty management and analysis: the practice and the potential. World Bank Technical Paper, 
No. 366 
Castilla, Carolina. (2008). Objective versus Subjective Poverty: Gaps Matter. Paper presented at the 
UNU-WIDER Conference on Frontiers of Poverty Analysis.   
Chambers, Robert. (2005). The best of both worlds? In Ravi Kanbur (Ed.), Q-Squared-Qualitative and 
Quantitative Poverty Appraisal: Complementarities, Tensions and the Way Forward, Centre 
for International Studies (University of Toronto) Q-Squared Working Paper, No.1. 
Chang, Ying & Graham Tipple. (2009). Realities of life and housing in a poor neighbourhood in urban 
China: livelihoods and vulnerabilities in Shanghai Lane, Wuhan. International Development 
Planning Review, 31(2), 165-198. 
Chen, Feng. (2008). Worker leaders and framing factory-based resistance. In Kevin J. O'Brien (Ed.), 
Popular Protest in China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Chen, Shaohua, Martin Ravallion & Youjuan Wang. (2006). Di Bao: a guaranteed minimum income 
 36 
in China's cities? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 3805. 
Chen, Zhenghui & Gareth Davey. (2008). Happiness and subjective well-being in mainland China. 
Journal of Happiness Studies, 9(4), 589-600. 
Chen, Zhihong. (2006). Measuring the poverty lines for urban households in China: an equivalence 
scale method. China Economic Review, 17(3), 239-252. 
Cheng, Zhiming. (2010). Poverty in China’s urban communities: profile and correlates. China Report, 
46(2), 143-173.  
CLB (China Labour Bulletin). (2004). Qiya yao gaizhi, gongren de quanyi yeyao zhongshi (The 
reforming enterprise has to attach importance to the rights and benefits of workers). Retrieved 
from http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/node/8133 on 12 January 2008. 
CLB (China Labour Bulletin). (2005). Standing Up: the Workers Movement in China, 2000-2004. 
Retrieved from http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/node/65086 on 22 September 2009  
CLB (China Labour Bulletin). (2007a). Speaking Out: the Workers Movement in China, 2005-2006. 
Retrieved from http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/node/98690 on 1 August 2008. 
CLB (China Labour Bulletin). (2007b). Xianyang textile workers' strike. Retrieved from 
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/17445 on 12 September 2009. 
CLB (China Labour Bulletin). (2008a). No way out: worker activism in China's state-owned 
enterprise reforms. Retrieved from 
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/File/research_reports/no_way_out.pdf on 22 September 2008. 
CLB (China Labour Bulletin). (2008b). Yuan chongqing guomian yichang xiagang zhigong tan 
shenghuo zhuangkuang ji shangfang (Laid-off workers of former Chongqing No.1 Cotton 
Mill talks about their life and appeals). Retrieved from 
http://www.china-labour.org.hk/schi/node/1300405 on 19 October 2008. 
CLB (China Labour Bulletin). (2009). The Workers Movement in China, 2007-2008. Retrieved from 
http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/node/1300871 on 10 September 2009. 
Creswell, John W. (2003). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Creswell, John W. & Vicki L. P. Clark. (2007). Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research. 
Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Davis, Deborah S. (Ed.). (2000). The Consumer Revolution in Urban China. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Dollar, David. (2007). Poverty, inequality, and social disparities during China's economic reform. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 4253. 
Flik, Robert J. & Bernard M. S. van Praag. (1991). Subjective poverty line definitions. De Economist, 
139(3), 311-330. 
Ge, Daoshun & Yang Tuan. (2004). Minimum income schemes for the unemployed: a case study from 
Dalian, China. International Social Sciences Journal, 56(179), 47-56. 
Giles, John, Albert Park & Fang Cai. (2006). How has Economic Restructuring Affected China's 
Urban Workers?. The China Quarterly, 185, 61-95. 
Giles, John, Albert Park & Juwei Zhang. (2005). What is China's true unemployment rate?. China 
Economic Review, 16(2), 149-170. 
Goedhart, Theo, Victor Halberstadt, Arie Kapteyn & Bernard van Praag. (1977). The poverty line: 
concept and measurement. Journal of Human Resources, 12(4), 503-520. 
Gustafsson, Björn A., Shi Li & Terry Sicular (Eds.). (2008). Inequality and Public Policy in China. 
 37 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gustafsson, Björn, Shi Li & Hiroshi Sato. (2004). Can a subjective poverty line be applied to China? 
Assessing poverty among urban residents in 1999. Journal of International Development, 16 
(8), 1089–1107. 
Gustafsson, Björn & Zhong Wei. (2000). How and why has poverty in China changed? a study based 
on microdata for 1988 and 1995. The China Quarterly, 164, 983-1006. 
Han, Chunping & Martin King Whyte. (2008). The social contours of distributive injustice feeling in 
contemporary China. In Deborah S. Davis & Wang Feng (Eds.), Creating Wealth and Poverty 
in Postsocialist China. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Han, Xiya & Hanming Chen. (2007). Guoqi gaige yu dangdai gongren jieji zhuren diwei de sangshi 
(The state-owned enterprise reform and the contemporary Chinese workers' lost status as 
master class). Retrieved from http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class4/200712/29392.html on 
21 August 2009. 
Hargreaves, James R., Linda A. Morison, John S. S. Gear, Mzamani B. Makhubele, John D. H. Porter, 
Joanna Busza, Charlotte Watts, Julia C. Kim & Paul M. Pronyk. (2007). "Hearing the voices 
of the poor": assigning poverty lines on the basis of local perceptions of poverty. a 
quantitative analysis of qualitative data from participatory wealth ranking in rural South 
Africa. World Development, 35(2), 212-229. 
He, Shenjing, Yuting Liu, Fulong Wu & Chris Webster. (2008). Poverty incidence and concentration 
in different social groups in urban China, a case study of Nanjing. Cities, 25(3), 121-132. 
Howe, Gerard & Andrew McKay. (2005). Combining quantitative and qualitative methods in 
assessing chronic poverty: the case of Rwanda. Centre for International Studies (University of 
Toronto) Q-Squared Working Paper, No.3,  
Huang, Xianbi. (2008). Guanxi networks and job searches in China's emerging labour market: a 
qualitative investigation. Work, Employment & Society, 22(3), 467-484. 
Huang, Youqin & Leiwen Jiang. (2009). Housing inequality in transitional Beijing. International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33(4), 936-956. 
Hurst, William. (2008). Mass frames and worker protest. In Kevin J. O'Brien (Ed.), Popular Protest in 
China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Hussain, Athar. (2002). Urban poverty in China: incidence and policy responses. In P. and Gordon 
Townsend, D. (Ed.), World Poverty: New Policies to Defeat and Old Enemy. Bristol: The 
Policy Press. 
Hussain, Athar, Peter Lanjouw & Nicholas Stern. (1994). Income inequalities in China: evidence from 
household survey data. World Development, 22(12), 1947-1957. 
Kanbur, Ravi. (2005a). Qualitative and quantitative poverty appraisal: the state of play and some 
questions. In Ravi Kanbur (Ed.), Q-Squared-Qualitative and Quantitative Poverty Appraisal: 
Complementarities, Tensions and the Way Forward, Centre for International Studies 
(University of Toronto) Q-Squared Working Paper, No.1. 
Kanbur, Ravi (Ed.). (2005b). Q-Squared: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Poverty 
Appraisal. Delhi: Permanent Black. 
Kapteyn, Arie, Peter Kooreman & Rob Willemse. (1988). Some methodological issues in the 
implementation of subjective poverty definitions. Journal of Human Resources, 23(2), 
222-242. 
Khan, Azizur Rahman, Keith Griffin & Carl Riskin. (1999). Income distribution in urban China 
 38 
during the period of economic reform and globalization," American Economic Review, 89(2), 
296-300. 
Kingdon, Geeta Gandhi & John Knight. (2006). Subjective well-being poverty vs. income poverty and 
capabilities poverty?. Journal of Development Studies, 42(7), 1199-1224. 
Knight, John B. & Shi Li. (2007). Three poverties in urban China. Review of Development Economics, 
10(3), 367-387. 
Knight, John & Ramani Gunatilaka. (2008). Aspirations, adaptation and subjective well-being of 
rural-urban migrants in China. Oxford University Department of Economics Discussion Paper 
Series, No. 381. 
Knight, John, Lina Song & Ramani Gunatilaka. (2007). Subjective well-being and its determinants in 
rural China. University of Oxford Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series, No. 
334. 
Lai, Gina & Rance P.L. Lee. (2006). Market reforms and psychological distress in urban Beijing. 
International Sociology, 21(4), 551-579. 
Layard, Richard. (2005). Happiness: Lesson from a New Science. New York: Penguin Press. 
Lee, Hong Yung. (2000). Xiagang, the Chinese style of laying off workers. Asian Survey, 40(6), 
914-937. 
Lee, Pak K. (1997). The political economy of state enterprise relations in China's Shaanxi province. 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, 27(3), 287-314. 
Li, Bingqin. (2004). Urban Social Exclusion in Transitional China. LSE Centre for Analysis of Social 
Exclusion Paper, No. 82. 
Li, Bingqin. (2005). Urban social change in transitional China: a perspective of social exclusion and 
vulnerability. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 13(2), 54-65. 
Li, Shi & Hiroshi Sato (Eds.). (2006). Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty in Urban China. New 
York: Routledge. 
Logan, John R., Yiping Fang & Zhanxin Zhang. (2009). Access to housing in urban China. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33(4), 914-935. 
Luo, Xubei & Nong Zhu. (2008). Rising income inequality in China: a race to the top. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper, No. 4700. 
MCA (Ministry of Civil Affairs). (2009). Quarterly statistical report of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(The 4th Quarter, 2008). Retrieved from 
http://cws.mca.gov.cn/accessory/200902/1233447562901.htm on 10 February 2009. 
Narayan, Deepa, Robert Chambers, Meera K. Shah & Patti Petesch. (2000). Voices of the Poor: 
Crying Out for Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Narayan, Deepa, Raj Patel, Kai Schafft, Anne Rademacher & Sarah Koch-Schulte. (2000). Voices of 
the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us?. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Narayanasamy, N. (2009). Participatory Rural Appraisal: Principles, Methods and Application. New 
Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Nielsen, Ingrid, Olga Paritski & Russell Smyth. (2010). Subjective well-being of Beijing taxi drivers. 
Journal of Happiness Studies, forthcoming. 
Niglas, K. (2004). The combined use of qualitative and quantitative methods in educational research. 
Tallinn: Tallinn Pedagogical University. 
Ravallion, Martin. (2008). Miss-targeted or miss-measured? Economics Letters, 100(1), 9-12. 
Ravallion, Martin. (2009). Decentralizing eligibility for a federal antipoverty program: a case study 
 39 
for China. The World Bank Economic Review, 23(1), 1-30. 
Ravallion, Martin & Shaohua Chen. (2006). China's (uneven) progress against poverty. Journal of 
Development Economics, 82(1), 1-42. 
Rojas, Mariano. (2004). Well-being and the complexity of poverty: a subjective well-being approach. 
UNU-WIDER Research Paper, No. 2004/29. 
Rojas, Mariano. (2007). Experienced poverty and income poverty in Mexico: a subjective well-being 
approach. World Development, 36(6), 1078-1093. 
SBS (Shaaxni Bureau of Statistics). (2006). Shaanxi Statistical Yearbook. Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin 
chuban she (Shaanxi People’s Press). 
SBS (Shaaxni Bureau of Statistics). (2008). Shaanxi Statistical Yearbook. Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin 
chuban she (Shaanxi People’s Press). 
Schimmel, Jorg. (2009). Development as happiness: the subjective perception of happiness and 
UNDP's analysis of poverty, wealth and development. Journal of Happiness Studies, 10(1), 
93-111. 
Sharp, Kay. (2003). Measuring destitution: integrating qualitative and quantitative approaches in the 
analysis of survey data. Institute of Development Studies Working Paper, No. 217. 
Smyth, Russell, Ingrid Nielsen & Qingguo Zhai. (2009). Personal well-being in urban China. Monash 
University Development Research Unit Discussion Paper, 09-01. 
Smyth, Russell & Xiaolei Qian. (2008). Inequality and happiness in urban China. Economics Bulletin, 
4(23), 1-10. 
Smyth, Russell, Qingguo Zhai & Jing Wang. (2001). Labour market reform in China's state-owned 
enterprises: a case study of post-Deng Funshun in Liaoning province. New Zealand Journal of 
Asian Studies, 3(2), 42-72. 
Solinger, Dorothy J. (2002). Labour market reform and the plight of the laid-off proletariat. The China 
Quarterly, 170, 304-326. 
Solinger, Dorothy J. (2008). The Dibao recipients: mollified anti-emblem of urban modernization. 
China Perspective, 4 (1), 36-47. 
STGMT (Shaanxi Study Group of Mao Zedong Thought). (2009a). Shaanxi bufen lituixiu gongren 
daibiao yu sheng zonggonghui dui hua er (The conversation between the representative of 
some retired workers and the Shaanxi Provincial Trade Union, No. 2) Retrieved from 
http://zggr.cn/?action-viewnews-itemid-9 
59 on 1 July 2009. 
STGMT (Shaanxi Study Group of Mao Zedong Thought). (2009b). Shaanxi bufen lituixiu gongren 
daibiao yu sheng zonggonghui dui hua yi (The conversation between the representative of 
some retired workers and the Shaanxi Provincial Trade Union, No. 1) Retrieved from 
http://zggr.cn/?action-viewnews-itemid-957 on 1 July 2009. 
Sun, Lijing. (2008). Gongren zhi lu: xi'an zhengliu bianyaqi chang zhigong de huchang douzheng 
(The road for workers: workers' fight for protecting the Xi'an Factory of Commutator 
Transformator). Beijing: Zhongguo wenhua chuanbo chuban she (China Cultural 
Communication Press). 
Tashakkori, Abbas & Charles Teddlie. (2003). Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral 
Research. Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Tashakkori, Abbas & Charles Teddlie. (1998). Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
 40 
Vermeer, Eduard B. (1988). Economic development in provincial China: the central Shaanxi since 
1930. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Vermeer, Eduard B. (2004). Shaanxi: building a future on state support. In David S. G. Goodman 
(Ed.), China's Campaign to 'Open up the West': National, Provincial and Local Perspectives. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wan, Guanghua (Ed.). (2008a). Inequality and Growth in Modern China. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wan, Guanghua (Ed.). (2008b). Understanding Inequality and Poverty in China: Methods and 
Applications. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Wang, Jinfu. (2007). Shaanxi sheng mian fangzhi chanye xianzhuang yanjiu (Research on 
performance of cotton textile industry in Shaanxi Province). Shandong fangzhi jingji 
(Shandong Textile Economy), 3, 14-16. 
Wang, Qingbin, Guanming Shi & Yi Zheng. (2002). Changes in income inequality and welfare under 
economic transition: evidence from urban China. Applied Economic Letter, 9(15), 989-991. 
Wang, Ya Ping. (2005). Low-income Communities and Urban Poverty in China. Urban Geography, 
26(3), 222-242. 
Watson, Andrew. (1998). Enterprise reform and employment change in Shaanxi province. Chinese 
Economies Research Centre Working Paper (University of Adelaide), No. 98/3. 
WB (World Bank). (2009). From poor areas to poor people: China's evolving poverty reduction 
agenda - an assessment of poverty and inequality in China. Retrieved from 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/defau 
lt/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/04/08/000334955_20090408062432/Rendered/PDF/4
73490SR0CN0P010Disclosed0041061091.pdf on 12 December 2009. 
Whyte, Martin K. (2010). Myth of the Social Volcano: Perceptions of Inequality and Distributive 
Injustice in Contemporary China. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Winkelmann, Rainer. (2008). Unemployment, social capital, and subjective well-being. Journal of 
Happiness Studies, 10(4), 421-430. 
Wu, Fulong. (2004). Urban poverty and marginalization under market transition: the case of Chinese 
cities. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28(2), 401-423. 
Wu, Fulong. (2007). The poverty of transition: from industrial district to poor neighbourhood in the 
city of Nanjing, China. Urban Studies, 44(13), 2673-2694. 
Wu, Fulong, Shenjing He & Chris Webster. (2010). Path dependency and the neighbourhood effect: 
urban poverty in impoverished neighbourhoods in Chinese cities. Environment and Planning 
A, 42(1), 134-152. 
Yang, Zhijun & Ting Huang. (2009). Quanqiu jinrong weiji dui wosheng jiuye chansheng yiding 
yingxiang (Influence of global financial crisis on the employment in Shaanxi Province).  
Retrieved from http://www.sn.stats.gov.cn/news/tjxx/2009311103052.htm on 23 May 2009. 
Yu, Wei-hsin. (2008). The psychological cost of market transition: mental health disparities in 
reform-era China. Social Problems, 55(3), 347-369. 
Yueh, Linda. (2006). Social capital, unemployment and women's labour market outcomes in urban 
China. In Shi Li & Hiroshi Sato (Eds.), Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty in Urban 
China. New York: RoutledgeCurzon. 
Yueh, Linda. (2009). Self-employment in urban China: Networking in a transition economy. China 
Economic Review, 20(3), 471-484. 
 41 
Zhao, Cheng. (8 June 2009). Jianren Buba, Zhansheng Kunnan--Wenjiabao Zongli Xi'an Kaocha Jishi 
(Be fortitudinous and overcome the difficulties - the event record of Premier Wen Jiabao's 
visit to Xi'an). Beijing: Renmin ribao (Renmin Daily).  
